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“’Starving Children in Africa’: Who Cares?”
By Lisa Cassidy
Abstract
The current state of global poverty presents citizens in the Global North with a
moral crisis: Do we care? In this essay, I examine two competing moral accounts of why
those in the North should or should not give care (in the form of charity) to impoverished
peoples in the Global South. Nineteen years ago feminist philosopher Nel Noddings
wrote in Caring that “we are not obliged to care for starving children in Africa” (1986, p.
86). Noddings’s work belongs to the arena of care ethics - the feminist philosophical
view that morality is about responding to, caring for, and preventing harm to those
particular people to whom one has emotional attachments. By contrast, Peter Singer’s
recent work, One World, advances an impartialist view of morality, which demands that
we dispassionately dispense aid to the most needy (2002, p.154). Thus this question
needs answering: am I obliged to give care to desperately poor strangers, and if so, which
moral framework (Singer's impartialism, or feminism’s care ethics) gives the best
account of that obligation? I argue that as an American feminist I should care for
Africans with whom I will never have a personal relationship. However, this obligation
can be generated without relying on the impartialist understanding of morality.
Keywords: feminism, care ethics, global poverty
Introduction
I imagine that many people would accept that volunteering time or giving funds to
the less fortunate is part of moral life. Sadly, there are so many worthy causes, and so
much suffering that needs to be alleviated, and (in the normal course of things) one does
not have limitless resources to expend on all those who are in need of one’s help. Some
people might reasonably believe that we have an obligation to help those in dire need,
regardless of their relationship to us. Yet others would counter that we only have
obligations to give care to our own loved ones.1 Our concern here will be a normative
one. Do we have obligations to care for distant others, and if we do, which type of moral
framework best accounts for this obligation? For example, do I, a white, American
woman with no particular nationalistic or historical ties to Africa, have to give care to the
poverty stricken, AIDS-afflicted, hungry, and politically repressed peoples who live
there?
The question of when, where, and how to give to charity is particularly pressing
to those from the Global North, who typically have tremendous affluence (compared with
those of us who live in the South). History will judge Americans and other Northerners
by how we respond to the needs of Southern peoples, just as history judges all those who
dwell in plenty while others struggle to survive. I do not want to diminish or dismiss the
poverty suffered by fellow Americans, or suffered by residents of other Northern
countries. It would be a gross inaccuracy to say that everyone in the North is rich, and
everyone in the South is poor. Yet if we do know anything about global economics, we
know that the average citizen of the US, say, has more material goods and social welfare
resources than the average citizen of the Sudan. The issue for the average American then
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becomes whether she ought to give her charity dollars to the Sudanese, rather than her
fellow countrymen, just because the Africans probably need her help more than her own
co-citizens do. Alternatively, one might argue that for the average American to really
care for people in distant lands is impossible, because we only truly care for our loved
ones.
The foci of this essay are our moral obligations to the world’s Southern poor, and
the moral perspectives that make sense of those obligations. Yet I must immediately
offer a significant disclaimer. I will eventually argue that Westerners do have an
obligation to aid those who suffer elsewhere in the world from dire poverty, but this is
not to say that ‘taking from the West and giving to the rest’ is presented here as an
ultimate solution to world poverty. I am not an economist. I suspect the long-term
solution to global poverty will include promoting democratic political structures,
economic self-determination, and universal human rights in the poorest nations, but those
are just my private suspicions, and arguments to support such suspicions are well beyond
the scope of this article.2 Thus I cannot say that giving charity dollars or euros to
Africans or others will definitively end world poverty, though if the money is spent
efficiently it will help alleviate tremendous human suffering. While I acknowledge here
that my view will suffer from a lack of attention to the structural causes of global
poverty, I hope to succeed in showing that it is morally required to really give care to
those in dire need.
In this essay I consider world poverty relief by revisiting a by-now notorious
comment made by feminist philosopher Nel Noddings, who argued twenty years ago that
“we” do not have to care for starving children in Africa. In his new book (2002),
philosopher Peter Singer has once again drawn our attention to that controversial remark.
The argument between Noddings and Singer is over care ethics; care ethics is a branch of
feminist theory that builds a moral perspective from women's experiences of caring for
others. Using Noddings as his exemplar, Singer holds that care ethics actually
discourages us from meeting our obligations to help people in the Global South. In my
view, Noddings must be wrong because I can care for starving children in Africa. But
Singer also needs correction because I do not need to be an “impartialist” to feel a sense
of obligation aid global poverty.
1. Feminism's Care Ethics as a Partialist Ethics
To understand Noddings’s remark in Caring that “we are not obliged to care for
starving children in Africa” (1984, pg. 86) we must first make a brief diversion into care
ethics. The philosophical theory known as care ethics actually began as an offshoot of
Harvard psychologist Carol Gilligan's child development research. In 1982 Gilligan
published In a Different Voice, the landmark of feminist theory that argued for an
expanded role of the “feminine voice” in morality. People who employ the feminine
voice in their moral reasoning will “seek to alleviate the real and recognizable trouble of
this world”, and for too long this voice has been ignored by psychologists (1982, pg.
100). Building on Gilligan's work, feminist philosophers have elaborated caring as an
ethos. In general, people who ascribe to care ethics believe that morality consists in
responding to the needs of oneself and others by meeting one's responsibilities to care.
For our concerns, a key feature of care ethics is its partiality. The significance of
this partiality may not at first be obvious, though this is where the debate between
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Noddings’s care ethics and Singer's impartialism lies. Under care ethics, moral decisions
are made by responding to the needs of self and others. Furthermore, care ethics has built
into it the reality that moral decisions are made partially. We should not expect
ourselves to respond to others' needs equally and without respect to our emotional
attachments to them. Instead, a care thinker reasons through moral problems in the social
context in which she find herself. This might mean privileging certain relationships or
people over others. In care ethics, impartiality is simply not a virtue.
On the other hand, a justice-centered ethic (such as the Utilitarianism that drives
Peter Singer) characterizes morally exemplary people as impartial and objective. We can
see an advantage to this approach; people who are impartial will reach fair solutions to
moral problems by weighing each actor's rights or goods, regardless of one's own
personal interests in the outcome. But notice that by placing a heavy stress on
impartiality, traditional ethical theories must then confront the so-called problem of
special obligations: are we ever justified in giving preference to our loved ones in times
of crisis? For an impartialist, one has no morally justifiable reason to rescue one's own
mother before a stranger out of a burning building, for example, because being partial to
one's own mother is self-interested, arbitrary, and discriminatory.
For care ethicists, however, special obligations are not a ‘problem’ so much as an
unalterable part of morality. Care thinkers take it for granted that we simply do take care
of the particular people we love and thus treat them with partiality. Being a morally
virtuous person under care ethics means responding to the needs of those others to whom
one has an attachment. People who use care reasoning to solve their moral problems do
not artificially adopt a ‘view from nowhere’ (1986), but are firmly lodged in the view
from over here. Rather than resorting to an impartialism to untangle our competing
obligations, care thinkers will rely on ad hoc moral judgments that best fit particular
situations and best preserve prioritized emotional attachments.
2. Nel Noddings’s Care Ethics
And now we return to Noddings, whose care ethics has lead her to claim that we
do not have to care for starving children in Africa. Armed with the theoretical
background of care ethics as partialist, we can now begin to make sense of her judgment.
She begins from the position that there are people who care (one-caring) and people who
are taken care of (cared-for). “Ethical caring, the relationship in which we do meet the
other morally, will be described as arising out of natural caring - the relation in which we
respond as one-caring out of love or natural inclination” (1984, pg. 4-5). When this
natural impulse to care is lacking, we summon our resources to provide care out of
principle. What she calls caring is the ethical ideal of "total engrossment" with another
person, a completed relationship. This makes for a completion of caring, an ideal to
which all caring aspires (1984, pg. 11-15).
Yet Noddings acknowledges that there are limits to caring, and this is how her
remark about not having obligations to Africans is justified within her work:
Our obligation is limited and delimited by relation. We are never free, in
the human domain, to abandon our preparedness to care; but, practically,
if we are meeting those in our inner circles adequately as ones-caring and
revive those linked to our inner circled by formal chains of relation we

Journal of International Women’s Studies Vol. 7 #1 November 2005
Published by Virtual Commons - Bridgewater State University, 2005

86
3

Journal of International Women's Studies, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 7

shall limit the calls upon our obligation quite naturally. We are not
obliged to summon the “I must” [care] if there is not possibility of
completion in the other. I am not obliged to care for starving children in
Africa, because there is no way for this caring to be completed in the other
unless I abandon the caring to which I am already obligated (1984, pg.
86).
One might immediately wonder how caring for an infant or a severely retarded adult
could possibly contain opportunities for reciprocity. But for Noddings, completion is not
reciprocity per se, but a highly personalized, unique, spontaneous relationship of
“meeting” the other. Such a completion of relationship is not typically possible with an
African, say, when one lives in America.
In later passages, Noddings explicitly demands that people in advantaged
countries, such as the United States, give money to charity to alleviate world poverty.
But this is not the same as genuine caring. “I can “care about” the starving children of
Cambodia, send five dollars to hunger relief, and feel somewhat satisfied ... This is a poor
second cousin to caring. “Caring about” involves a certain benign neglect. One is
attentive just so far. One assents with just so much enthusiasm” (1984, pg. 112). Thus
Nodding cuts the distinction between ‘caring for’ and ‘caring about.’ When people give
time or money to charitable causes that will benefit others in very distant lands, this is not
caring for Africans or Cambodians, but caring about them. Noddings has made the
clever observation that caring about is not as personal or authentic as caring for. For
example, Charles Dickens’s Bleak House gives us Mrs. Jellaby, who is so self-satisfied
caring about starving children in distant places that she fails to care for the needy
children right in front of her: “She was a pretty, very diminutive plump woman of from
forty to fifty, with handsome eyes, though they has a curious habit of seeming to look a
long way off. As if [sic] they could see nothing nearer than Africa” (Dickens,
1853/1977, pg. 37).3
The partialism of Noddings’s care ethics is apparent because she makes the
personalized, caring relationship with another central to ethics, eschewing objectivity and
impartiality. However, the high demands of one-caring require that we reign in the scope
of people for whom we care (though not necessarily for whom we just care about). I
think Noddings would say it is just impossible for Americans to care for “starving
children in Africa” the same way they care for their loved ones. This is true by the fiat of
her definition of one-caring. The shape of her argument is: if being in a personal
relationship is a requirement of caring, and I cannot be in a personal relationship with
starving millions, then I cannot care for starving millions.
There are three problems with Noddings’s account. First, as someone who shares
many of Noddings’s political and philosophical commitments, I must immediately
distance myself from her work. Her denial of obligations to starving Africans and her
feeble comments about giving money to Cambodians are both ethically unacceptable, as I
will shortly argue in section 4. I do think we have real moral obligations to people we
have never met based on the moral injunction to respond to evils with caring, and
tremendous human suffering (such as what is experienced by those who are deeply
impoverished) is such an evil. Yet taken as a whole, Noddings’s work leaves the
impression that poverty in the Global South is unimportant, that Northerners working to
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relieve it are just self-satisfied dilettantes who don’t really care, and that the entire issue
is ethically marginal in comparison to our personal relationships. In short, she seems to
ignore the demands of justice, as Claudia Card has demonstrated (Card, 1990, pg. 107).
At a minimum Noddings ought to have phrased her comments with more circumspection.
Second, many of the problems with Noddings’s denial of obligations to the
Global South is related to her very specific definition of true caring as being in a
personal, completed relationship with another. This definition needs more argument than
she has given it to answer obvious objections. Why is the personal relationship the ideal?
Why is caring conceived of as the personal administration of care in one-on-one setting?
Why can we not care for people we have never met? I suspect Noddings would reply
that I could care about cause of world poverty (as Mrs. Jellaby does), but in doing so I do
not care for Khalid, Puja, or any of the other people who hopefully benefit from my
actions. This is true in some way, and Noddings has defended her position by offering
that at best we can use our chains of relation to rely on those people or organizations we
trust to distribute donated funds we (Noddings, 1990, pg. 122). Yet the burden of proof
is on Noddings to show that the fact that one may never have “completion” with the
distant recipients of one’s care means that one really does not care for them in any
significant sense. I contend that Noddings has overestimated the completion element in
her definition of caring. Her emphasis on personalized caring for, she acknowledges in a
later work, gives short shrift to caring about: “In many cases, we simply cannot care for
because of distance or limited resources. We make a step in the right direction by caring
about” (Noddings, 1998, pg. 162, emphasis added).
Finally, my third and most central objection to Noddings is that she has mistaken
the partialist insight of care ethics. What care ethics gets right is a psychological insight
about how we solve moral problems. None of us is an isolated, abstracted, asocial pod;
we are flesh and blood people with real social entanglements, and that richness cannot be
willed away in the moral realm. Partialism rejects the fantasy that moral obligations
somehow stand majestically outside social reality. We should prioritize the needs of
those people who matter to us, to whom we are emotionally attached. Where Noddings
has made a mistake is in conceiving ‘the people who matter to us’ exclusively as those
with whom we share interpersonal relationships. No doubt Noddings is right to say that
we care for our loved ones more than for strangers. But she is wrong to elevate the
interpersonal at the expense of all other kinds of emotional attachments, particularly
since that elevation results in a denial of charitable obligations to the neediest. Nodding
has overcorrected impartialism. She mistakenly advocates a partialism that grounds
morality in personal relationships, whereas the real insight of partialism is that morality is
rooted in emotional attachments (and not necessarily personal relationships, per se).
3. Peter Singer's Impartialism
Peter Singer's recent work One World (2002) continues his long-standing
campaign against global poverty. He advances impartialism as part of a Utilitarian
ethics. Utilitarians believe that right actions are the ones which produce the most
happiness for everyone overall. Moral judgments ought not be based on what best
benefits "our own kind" but what will benefit our one world. This leads Singer to say we
should strive for impartiality in moral judgments because without impartiality we would
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only seek to promote the happiness of those with whom we feel some personal or even
nationalistic connection (2002, pg. 154).
He turns his attention to the issue of globalization and economic justice. He asks:
“What impartial reasons can there be for favoring one's compatriots over foreigners?”
(2002, pg. 167) and answers ‘none.’ While it is tempting to think that nationalistic
connections justify giving partial preference to aid our fellow Americans before Africans,
in fact they do not. A sovereign nation is only an imagined community, not a face-toface one. (This is especially true in a large and diverse nation such as the United States.)
We justify having special obligations to our co-citizens based on what we imagine to be
our shared American values and commitments, but in fact it is our imagination - not the
existence of an ‘American community’ itself - that does the work in producing this sense
of special obligation (2002, pg. 170).
Since that is the case, Singer continues, we can reimagine the size and scope of
our community. Singer urges that we imagine we are in a world community to overcome
the (partialist, in his view) prejudice that we ought to give care to our friends, neighbors,
and fellow citizens first. The point of creating an imaginary world community is to
satisfy those who cannot help but aid ‘their own’ first. It is interesting to note that the
imaginary community position comes alongside Singer’s discussion of eighteenth century
Utilitarian philosopher William Godwin. Godwin argued that if a chambermaid, who
was his own mother, was trapped in a burning building with the Archbishop Fénelon (a
man who was inspiring many to do good works), he would save Fénelon before the
mother (cited in 2002, pg. 156). Singer holds up Godwin as the perfect impartialist who
prioritizes the greatest good of humanity before his own emotional attachments. Yet
since few of us will be Godwin, and we are for the most part susceptible to making moral
judgments partially, we must use our moral imaginations to reset the parameters of our
community memberships.
For example, by believing that I am in a single community which includes
Americans and Sudanese, I can impartially judge who most needs my help and who will
benefit the most from it. I should give my charity dollars to the war traumatized and
utterly impoverished people of the Sudan, instead of the otherwise well provided-for
American victims of September 11, 2001, say. Perhaps it would take a Godwin-like
impartiality for the average American to reach out to Sudanese instead of New Yorkers.
But if the Sudanese are in my community, making the correct utilitarian decision to give
help where it will create the greatest happiness will not be so difficult. I give help to
those who are in most need of it, regardless of national identity, by practicing
impartialism. Such impartialism gives us principled reasons to make rational decisions
that produce the greatest happiness for our world.
Here is what Singer has to say about feminism's partiality in care ethics, as it
relates to global economic justice:
Modern critics of impartialism argue that an advocate of an impartial
ethics would make a poor parent, lover, spouse, or friend, because the very
idea of such personal relationships involves being partial towards the other
person with whom one is in the relationship. This means giving more
consideration to the interests of your child, lover, spouse, or friend than
you give to a stranger. Feminist philosophers, in particular, tend to stress
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the importance of personal relationships, which they accuse male moral
philosophers of neglecting. Nel Noddings, author of a book called
Caring, limits our obligation to care for those with whom we can be in
some kind of relationship. Hence, she says, “we are not obliged to care
for starving children in Africa” (2002, pg. 158-9).
Singer goes on to write that partialism is somewhat appropriate at the everyday, intuitive
level of morality, but impartialism is demanded by the more reflective, critical level of
morality where we evaluate our principles to see if they contribute to the greatest good
overall (2002, pg. 160).
While I admire much of Singer's work, his reference to and dismissal of feminism
in this one passage strikes me as gratuitous. If one had little experience with feminism or
care ethics, as is the case with my Business Ethics students who read Singer’s book, one
might walk away from Singer's discussion with the impression that Noddings’s
comments are representative of all feminists - which they are not. It really does do
feminists a bad turn to pick out only Noddings’s views and portray them as the feminist
position. Furthermore, Singer's enormous professional stature (he is probably the most
well-known, English-language, living philosopher) lends even more weight to his
condemnation of feminist philosophy. Feminists have enough difficulty getting heard in
mainstream philosophy without Singer contributing to their marginalization.
Furthermore, because Singer dismisses feminism so quickly, he misses entirely an
important feminist critique to which he is vulnerable. The abstract impartialism that
Singer advocates is implausible from a feminist position. Indeed, I think we ought to be
suspicious of an argument that uses an example such as Godwin’s. We can give Godwin
the benefit of the doubt that Fénelon inspired goodness in more people than his own
mother, a mere chambermaid in his scenario. Be that as it may, I think most people
would agree that Godwin’s judgment to save Fénelon is warped by an overly rigorous
adherence to an abstract principle, and an insufficient attention to one’s actual
attachments. We should be wary of impartialism because Godwin’s judgment is so
excessive. Not only does the Singer-Godwin version of impartialism not solve the
“problem” of special obligations, it denies the existence of special obligations entirely and this denial does not reflect our ordinary experiences. Singer’s position disregards the
powerful feminist criticism (of impartialism, but of justice-centered ethics more
generally) that we are not disembodied, disengaged minds who practice morality as a
rational exercise in distributing units of happiness or equal rights (see, for example, Held,
1993; hooks, 1984; Tronto, 1994; Ruddick, 1989; Walker, 1998). Singer’s glib
comments about feminism cost him the chance to really engage with the well-established
and well-argued criticism that an abstract and overly rationalistic account of morality,
such as the one he proposes, fails to accurately describe the facts of moral life.
In addition, Singer’s own system betrays some awareness of the problems of
impartialism. By posing that we must re-imagine our community as a community of one
world, Singer grants reluctant acknowledgment to the truth that people will care for their
near and dear ones before strangers, even if Singer himself wishes this was not so.
(Singer does include a vague nod to evolutionary biology, however, when he says that
parents caring for their own children before others’ seems to be hardwired into us (2002,
pg.161-2).) The imaginary one world community, it seems to me, exists as a motivation
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to inspire the well-off to care for the less fortunate in distant lands, just in case Singer’s
straightforward utilitarian argument fails to be properly motivating. Yet why mention an
emotional attachment (such as community membership) at all if impartialism is right and
emotional attachments ought to be meaningless in morality? I do not think Singer has
been inconsistent in his formulation, but my criticism is that by posing the imaginary one
world community Singer is not far from admitting that (for us non-Godwin types,
anyway) we in the North cannot be relied upon to give to the South without appealing to
emotional attachments.
4. A Partialist Argument about Caring for ‘Starving Children in Africa’
Feminists who advocate care ethics believe that moral judgments ought to be
personal, contextual, and preserve emotional attachments. Singer counters that unless we
take the impartial view, we will arbitrarily and unfairly prefer our fellow Americans at
the expense of deeply impoverished others who truly need our help. Which moral
perspective better suited to respond to the charity challenge of global poverty: Singer's
impartial approach, or feminism's care ethics?
We can begin to answer this question by first arguing that Northerners do indeed
have charitable obligations to others in distant lands. My argument here is brief and
hopefully simple. The first premise is that widespread, dire material poverty is a source
of tremendous human suffering on a grand scale. (‘Tremendous’ and ‘grand scale’ are
needed. A moral obligation to respond to every variety of human suffering on any scale
would be impossible to enact and impossible to argue.) This premise does not strike me
as controversial, but simply as an accurate description of how deeply gross poverty
impacts human life. Secondly, I hold that tremendous human suffering on a grand scale
is an evil. Of course, someone might doubt the existence of evils, but such skepticism is
hard to maintain in this context. Indeed, if anything counts as an evil, I think tremendous
human suffering on a grand scale would be it. Third, evils are the sorts of things that
demand (i.e. obligate) a caring response from those capable of care-responding to them.
Dire poverty hence demands a caring response from all those who are capable of
responding, and charitable donations to the very poor are one possible form of such care.
This argument sketched here can be filled in a bit. One might object that we have
no obligations to respond to evils, but only have obligations not to commit evils
ourselves. I think this minimalist account of morality seems anemic, and a well-rounded
account of moral life will include positive duties. Indeed, responding to evils with care
seems to be the very stuff that morality is made of. Furthermore, one might object that
even if morality demands that we respond to evils, more reasons are needed to believe
that one must respond to evils with caring. My answer is to recall the centrality of care
in human existence. Noddings has discussed Heidegger’s work: “From his perspective,
we are immersed in care; it is the ultimate reality of human life” (Noddings, 1992, pg.
15). I agree with Noddings’s Heidegger. Human life does not function without caring,
and morality reinforces the primacy of caring by generating the obligation to give care
when confronted with great evils.
If the argument that we have obligations to respond with care to poor strangers is
compelling, one might still ask why alleviating poverty via charitable donations the best
way to meet this obligation. As I stated in my opening disclaimer, it may be that such
charity is not the best response to world poverty. I have not argued that economic aid
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flowing from North to South will end world poverty or is the best solution to it. The
argument posed here is only that we in the North ought to help Southerners, and charity
is one kind of caring response.
Having sketched the argument that we have obligations to give care to distant
others, we can now examine this caring itself more closely. We do not need to make
sweeping claims about human nature to assert that most reasonably well-balanced people
do experience emotional attachments to others. Particularly, we become attached and
have feeling for fellow human beings in pain (and obviously we form attachments on
other basis, as well). I am not sure that this premise needs argument as much as
verification from our experience. We can ask ourselves if, in general, people frequently
feel for others when we know they are suffering. (Indeed, if one is persuaded by
evolutionary biology, it might stand to reason that in a social species such as ours,
emotional attachments for suffering fellow beings would be selected as contributing to
species success.) Even though it stands to reason that we forge emotional attachments to
others, and this is a hallmark of humanity, if one had to characterize the philosophical
attitude towards emotionality and emotional attachments, it would a hostile one (Jaggar,
1989).
Of course, finding that we feel attached to those who hurt does not deny the
depths of depravity to which we can sink. There might be many reasons why emotional
attachments are forestalled, extinguished, or wholly absent. My guess is that the best
account of emotional attachments for others is that, like other human experiences, these
attachments are greatly shaped by social conditions. I do not want to say, as Hume does,
that sympathy is natural to us, that its origins lie in human nature. My claim here is
simply that we have emotional attachments for fellow beings who are suffering - whether
the attachments’ source is human nature, social conditioning, or some combination - and
this is observed with enough frequency that we might safely generalize that we often
enough feel for others who suffer.
Caring for others emerges in response to the demands of human life (Ruddick
1989). One such demand is meeting the needs of others and alleviating their suffering.
That is, experiencing emotional attachments for others can prompt caring behavior
towards them. Ideally we would experience emotional attachments for others who are
suffering and then act on this emotional attachment by caring for them to alleviate their
suffering, meeting their needs. There are obstacles to this idealized progression, and I am
aware my account may seem Pollyannaish if it does not acknowledge that we sadly have
innumerable examples of the failure to have attachments and the failure to care. Some
people are utterly lacking in feeling for others. Some people may have emotional
attachments for others, but for any number of reasons find themselves unable to follow
through with caring behavior. Some people may feel emotional attachments to others
that hurt, but unreliably or only when those others resemble themselves. Some people
may care but in inappropriate or harmful ways. Some people may be forced into giving
care for others without actually wanting to. The recipients of such emotional attachments
and care might reject those feelings and efforts, and so on. But none of these possible
monkey-wrenches threatens the basic outline that care can emerge as a result of feeling
for others. The care ethical “injunction to care” can be understood as rooted in the
emotional attachments we often feel for each other.
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So far I do not think Singer or Noddings would disagree with what I have said
about the sources of caring. In fact, we three can agree that the moral problem of
charitable obligations to others in distant lands enters when Americans, for example,
cease to act on our attachments for Africans and others, or else are so preoccupied with
our daily chores and worries that we feel no real attachment. I suspect many Americans
do not give care to starving strangers because either we cease feeling emotional
attachments for them or else we are unable to act on attachments by caring.
What I have said so far is not terribly controversial, though this juncture is where
Singer and Noddings diverge. Singer believes that the only way to ensure the needs of
the deeply impoverished in the global South are met is to act impartially by cutting off
sentiments because we simply run out of emotional attachments when we are not
personally invested in foreigners' welfare. Noddings, on the other hand, makes the hard
claim that we simply do not care for (in her highly personalized and ‘complete’ definition
of caring) and cannot be expected to care for distant others. My criticisms of each have
shown that neither account is fully satisfying. It may be true that we prefer our near-anddear ones in moral judgment, and we try to save them from harm before others. But this
truth does not foreclose another truth: that we have obligations to respond with care to
those who endure the evil of suffering deep poverty, even if we have not met them and do
not have a personal relationship with them.
We can show partial preferences for impoverished strangers by drawing on our
emotional attachments for fellow beings that are suffering. I want to say that we can
retain the partiality of care ethics by giving preferences to those with whom we feel the
most. Caring need not be grounded in an interpersonal relationship but in our emotional
attachments for others whose needs and suffering are tremendous. We do not need to be
impartial to have obligations to victims of world poverty. In fact, a highly emotional
partiality is useful to promote caring for victims of global poverty.
I propose we build on emotional attachments for “starving African children” by
giving partial preferences to those who arouse our emotions the most. Singer's view, that
we cannot rely on the vagaries of feeling to alleviate global poverty, underestimates our
empathetic capacities. We should practice triage, not just in the allocation of resources to
help those who are needy, but also a triage of emotional attachments. To say that we
might order our feelings for others is not to say we practice impartiality. Rather it means
that we are partial to those with whom we feel the most. And contra Singer, we can feel
with those who suffer the most, not just with our compatriots who look like we do or
speak our language. I do believe that if more Americans really knew the conditions
under which 30,000 children under age 5 die each day from preventable causes around
the world, emotional attachments would prompt caring action.
It might seem that my call to meet our obligations to care for distant others is
identical to Noddings’s remarks on caring about distant others, which we have seen she
labels a mere “good start.” But I do mean achieving a real caring for distant strangers. I
do think that is possible. As argued in section 2, Noddings’s definition of ‘caring for’
over-exaggerates the role of personal relationships, when she ought to have emphasized
the role of emotional attachments in ‘caring for.’ Thus when I claim we can meet our
obligations to the Global South by caring for those suffering there, I am not using
Noddings’s definition of the phrase, but a revised sense that instead stresses the
emotional component of actively empathizing and responding to those who are suffering
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greatly. Charitable giving, when prompted by such emotional attachments, can be seen
as a genuine act of caring for – even though I acknowledge this is a departure from
Noddings’s sense of that term.
The partiality of care ethics has two advantages when surveying the challenges of
global poverty. First, it acknowledges the moral reality that we do care for those we are
most attached to first and foremost. As care ethicist Virginia Held has written, “The
hunger of our own children comes before the hunger of children we do not know, the
hunger of children in Africa ought to come before some of the expensive amusements we
may feel like providing for our own children” (1993, pg. 74). This might immediately
sound unpromising for starving Africans, yet it is a moral reality that cannot be argued
away. But secondly, care ethics maximizes (rather than denies) the role of partiality and
emotionality in producing moral acts. We can and should care for those people with
whom we make an emotional connection based on the depths of their hardship and
suffering. We can use this care ethics framework to be partial towards those who tug on
our hearts the most - giving preference to those people whose connection to us is not
interpersonal, but personalized through our emotional attachments.
Before concluding, two objections need to be addressed. First, one might worry
that after all the criticism I have made against Singer, I have endorsed his rather
simplistic solution to world poverty, charity that flows from the North to the South (as
outlined in One World (2002) and other works, for example, Singer, 1999). This
objection finds that since I argue in favor of charitable giving to relieve world poverty,
just as Singer does, I am vulnerable to the same objections as he. Namely, that his
strategy utterly fails to reckon with the structural causes of world poverty. By ignoring
the real causes of world poverty, the most a Singer-type approach does is just stick a
finger in poverty’s leaking dam. The second, somewhat related objection to my view is
that by endorsing the care-taking of strangers in distant lands we will ignore the pressing
obligations those in the North help to “their own” poor. This objection need not fall prey
to Singer’s worry, preferring to aid one own co-citizens first is arbitrary. In fact, it can be
argued that Americans, for example, have an obligation to give charity to other
Americans before Ethiopians, say, because wealthy Americans benefit more directly
from the poverty of poor Americans than they do from the poverty of poor Ethiopians.
Thus it might be argued that Americans owe each other charity before others in distant
lands, not because of physical proximity, but the proximity of exploitation. These two
objections are similar in that they analyze poverty and its alleviation along structural
lines.
My response to the first objection, that I endorse Singer’s simplistic solutions to
world poverty, is to admit that Singer has made some valid points. Singer is right, of
course, that there is no famine in the United States, whereas famine is more frequent in
other parts of the world. And I think Singer is right to say that we should give care to
those who need it most, although I have argued this determination should be made
partially, not impartially. However, I do not think the areas of overlap I share with
Singer should be construed as an endorsement of the Singer solution to world poverty.
Whatever the structural causes of world poverty are, charitable giving surely will not
eliminate them. Yet I think I am not vulnerable to the first objection because, unlike
Singer, I have not depicted North-to-South charity as the solution, but only as an succor
to poverty. My response to the second objection, that people have greater obligations to
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their poor neighbors, is similar to the first objection. Such structural economic critique is
beyond the purview of my comments here. For this objection to work, one would need to
show (along Marxist lines, perhaps?) the wealth is acquired by the exploitation of nearby
others. Even if such an argument could be made, it still does not address the material
reality that (for the most part) people in the South need aid more than people in the
North, a point on which Singer is persuasive.
I think wealthy Northerners can build on our emotional attachments to sufferers to
be more caring towards Southerners. My hope is that caring for the Global South ceases
to be a moral challenge and instead becomes a political one. We need political strategies
to rediscover emotional attachments and prompt caring towards the deeply impoverished.

1

Since Noddings makes the helpful distinction between ‘caring for’ and ‘caring about’, I
will frequently use the somewhat clumsy phrase ‘giving care to.’ This phrase is
deliberately ambiguous and could include ‘caring for’ and ‘caring about’.
2
Other feminists have turned their attention to this problem lately. See, for example,
Jaggar 1998, Sterba 2002, and Young 1990.
3
I am indebted to Kay Mathiesen for this literary reference.
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